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My contribution is focused to a modest framework creation for asylum-
immigration theory. By means of arms-export data from 17 Western European countries, 
tested against inflow of asylum seekers to these countries, covering the past 26 years, it is 
clear that arms-export from these countries do not contribute to their own asylum-inflow. 
The main theoretical contribution to existing literature on arms export and migration is 
therefore that I separate plausible causes of outgoing migration (arms export to countries 
from where asylum flows are generated) from determinants of asylum immigration. 
Empirically, I disprove such hypothetical indirect connections put forward both within 
academic literature and by NGOs like Amnesty International. Instead, I find the counter-
intuitive, namely that increased arms export leads to less asylum immigration. Also, in 
contrast to previous literature on asylum immigration, I build on Granovetter (1973) and 
propose that diffusion of information through asylum networks depend on weak social 
connections as opposed to close relationships like ethnic bonds, family ties and 
friendships. In addition, I problematize the tendency of existing literature to treat asylum 
seekers as labor migrants and argue for a framework founded on principles which 
account for the unique circumstances and life situations faced by asylum seekers. In 
doing so I also extend on previous quantitative works and find that crucial determinants 
for inflow are signified by the generosity of the welfare state, absence of far right 
sentiments, and religious diversity. The wealth of a country, its general quality of life, its 
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 Since the beginning of the 1980s, Western Europe has seen a remarkable increase 
in asylum applications. Between 1980 and 1985, the European Union – 15 (EU-15, pre-
enlargement) received roughly 540,200 asylum applications, which can be compared to 
approximately 1,489,000 filed applications between 2000 and 2003. Out of all claims 
logged in industrial countries, Western Europe has received 2/3. The main inflow comes 
from Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. A peak in total number of applications can be 
noted in the early 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union, with most coming from 
Eastern Europe and going to Germany. In part, the close geographical proximity of 
Germany to the east can explain the main country destination. By contrast, the numbers 
of African and Asian applications display a continuous and firm increase over time 
(Hatton, 2005:106-107).  
 In reaction to the large inflow, a general xenophobic perception of refugees as 
hazards to the economy and its welfare distribution have emerged (Lindstrom, 2005:588-
589). Though EU states are obligated by the Geneva Convention on the Status of 
Refugees1 to grant asylum, states have undertaken restrictive unilateral measures to tackle 
the large inflow. As a consequence, tensions between EU members have developed, since 
such policies are believed to have deflected asylum flows to some countries. Therefore, 
                                                
1 According to the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, an asylum seeker is a person who has 
applied for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention on the Status of Refugees on rightful grounds. To 
qualify as an asylum seeker, an application has to be filed based on the claim that, if returned to the country 
of origin, a well-founded fear exist of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political belief, 
or membership of a distinct social group. One remains an asylum seeker as long as one’s application is 
pending, or until an appeal against a refusal of the application is resolved. In this respect, a refugee is an 






in 1992, Germany proposed a EU-wide asylum-burden sharing system. While the 
agreement was unsuccessful, due to differing opinions between member states, other 
smaller measures have been implemented to harmonize asylum policy across EU. Among 
them are joint visa regimes and a common refugee definition. Concurrently, states have 
enhanced their unilateral deterrence measures to further defer asylum applications. 
Example areas covered by such policies are access, status determination and the 
integration of asylum seekers. With respect to access, the so-called “safe third country 
provisions”, initially implemented in Germany in 1993, is considered one of the more 
successful policy implementations. In practice, this allows border guards to deny asylum 
seekers entry if they arrive via another “safe” country where they could have applied for 
asylum and been likely to achieve it (Thielemann, 2003:6-8). Another restriction on entry 
comes from demanding that asylum seekers obtains visas before entering the country to 
file their claim and by fining airlines that allow passengers traveling without such 
documents (Bloch, 2000:34; Hatton, 2005:108). As an example, in 1998, British Airways 
was fined 2.5 million pounds to be paid out to the UK government for allowing 
passengers with incomplete or false documentation onboard their aircrafts (Bloch, 
2000:34). Concerning status determination and integration policy, common approaches 
are to restrict access to work permits and social security benefits during the process of 
treating the asylum claim, i.e. before the status of the asylum seeker has been determined, 
and to extend the time-frame for processing such cases, inhibiting integration by creating 






 Nevertheless, while a boost in overall inflow to Western Europe for the 
past two and a half decades is notable, the main destinations vary greatly over time 
(Hatton, 2005:106-107). This thesis analyzes the causes of this variance and investigates 
what factors contribute to larger inflows received by some countries compared to others. 
In this context, I note that while theories of migration traditionally have focused on 
helping us understand migratory movements within their broader political and economic 
contexts, it is only recently that researchers have turned the eyes to explaining destination 
choices of asylum seekers. As part of this focus, some studies have noted patterns 
between arms trade from asylum receiving countries to the same destinations as the 
origins of their refugee communities and argued for an indirect connection between these 
variables. I address the lack of empirical evidence underlying these studies and the 
broader political discourse put forward by NGOs like Amnesty International in this 
context. Using western European arms-export data, covering 26 years (1981 to 2007), I 
find that arms-export from Western European countries do not contribute to the number 
of asylum seekers in those countries. In this regard, my main theoretical contribution to 
existing literature on arms export and migration is that I separate plausible causes of 
outgoing migration (arms export to countries from where asylum flows are generated) 
from determinants of asylum immigration while also disproving such claims empirically. 
Instead, I find the counter-intuitive, namely that increased arms export leads to less 
asylum immigration. This is attributed to the so called “guns for butter trade off” where 
social expenditure, one of the found significant determinants for asylum-immigration, is 
negatively associated with arms export but positively associated with asylum inflow. 





Granovetter (1973) and propose that diffusion of information through asylum networks 
depend on weak social connections as opposed to close relationships like ethnic bonds, 
family ties and friendships. In addition, I problematize the tendency of existing literature 
to treat asylum seekers as labor migrants and argue for a framework founded on 
principles which account for the unique circumstances and life situations faced by asylum 
seekers. In doing so I also extend on previous quantitative works and find that crucial 
determinants for inflow are signified by the generosity of the welfare state, absence of far 
right sentiments, and religious diversity. The wealth of a country, its general quality of 




















Between 1980 and 1990, the overall recorded inflow to the EU-15 mounted to 
1,642,000 applicants. Out of these, 432,000 were from Eastern Europe, 227,000 were of 
African origin, and 742,000 were Asians. The top seven destinations for this period are 
Germany followed by France, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium. 
During the following decade, the inflow peaked to 4,033,000. At this point, 1,647,000 
applicants were from Eastern Europe, 745,000 were Africans, and 1,349,000 were of 
Asian origin. In short, between 1990 and 2000, the inflow from Eastern Europe alone 
exceeded the total inflow of the previous decade. For this period the ranking of the top 
seven destinations appear in a slightly different order. Germany remains the most popular 
destination but is followed by the UK, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Belgium, and 
lastly Austria.  
One notes an even greater variance when looking at five years intervals. As can 
be seen in Table 1 on the following page, while Germany maintains its popularity 
throughout both decades, the ranking among the top 10 countries fluctuates surprisingly 
for each time point over the past two decades. Take the Netherlands, for example, which 
moves from being the 8th most popular country in the first period (1980 to 1984) to being 
ranked as the 3rd most common destination in the last period (1995 to 1999). Conversely, 
Austria moves from 3rd place in the first period down to 8th in the third period. Another 
case in point is Sweden, which steadily increases in popularity during the first three 
periods from 4th place (1980 to 1984) to 3rd place (1985 to 1989) and then 2nd (1990 to 







Table 1: Ranking of Top 10 Destinations Between 1980-2000 (in rounded hundreds)2 
R 1980 - 1984 1985 - 1989 1990 - 1994 1995 - 1999 
1 Germany (249 600)  Germany (455 300) Germany (1 374 700) Germany (749 600) 
2 France (106 300) France (178 700) Sweden (197 000) UK (223 300) 
3 Austria (63 200) Sweden (97 100) France (184 500) Netherlands (170 400) 
4 Sweden (41 900) Austria (64 400) Netherlands (151 100) France (112 200) 
5 UK (17 500) Netherlands (46 400) UK (150 800) Belgium (93 400) 
6 Italy (16 500) Denmark (42 100) Belgium (87 000) Austria (53 500) 
7 Belgium (14 500) Belgium (32 100) Denmark (76 400) Italy (48 800) 
8 Netherlands (8 800) UK (28 500) Austria (76 100) Sweden (48 500) 
9 Greece (6 400) Italy (26 300) Spain (53 100) Denmark (36 000) 
10 Denmark (5 600) Greece (24 000) Italy (40 800) Spain (30 400) 
 
 
This thesis examines the variance noted in these patterns by investigating which 
factors explain why asylum seekers go where they go. This has important policy 
implications on what destination countries can do to handle the growing inflow. In 
particular, a better understanding of the expectations that influence asylum applicants in 
their choice of destination is crucial for the design of successful asylum policy and, 
perhaps even more so, for integration policy. To explore what factors may cause inflow, I 
here put to the test what appear to be undetermined causal factors and incoherent 
findings.  
 
                                                





Arms Export: A Determinant for Asylum Destination? 
 To my knowledge, three qualitative studies can be found that implies a possible 
connection between arms export from Western European countries to countries from 
where asylum flows are generated to specific country destinations in Western Europe. 
The first one comes from Westander (1995) who focuses on the magnitude of Swedish 
arms export to countries in war between 1980 and 1994.  He identifies a pattern between 
export destinations and origin countries of refugees living in Sweden: between 1980 and 
1994, two out of three asylum applicants in Sweden had left recipient countries of 
Swedish exports.  
Hermele (1997) expands on Westander (1995) in a section of his overarching work 
on migration and development. Hermele sees arms export as one of the root causes of 
refugee flows, where export to developing countries is viewed as a contributing push 
factor to outflow from South to North. Noting how “governments in the North close their 
eyes to such connections” (p. 154), Hermele outlines how some of the most prominent 
immigration countries also are major exporters of arms.  In 1992 seven top immigration 
countries accounted for 72% of the global trade in arms, which mounted to 18 billion US 
dollars. Out of these, the US represented 46%, Germany 10%, France 6%, UK 5%, the 
Netherlands 2%, Italy 2%, and Sweden 1%. In this context Hermele refers to Westander 
(1995) and points to how 65% of all refugees entering Sweden between 1983 and 1994 
came from war zones where one of the warring parties had received Swedish arms.  
 Building on the findings by Westander (1995) and Hermele (1997), Mezey, Suter, 
Fich and Miran (2003) examine its applicability in two separate cases. Drawing on 





Iran and Sweden and former Yugoslavia to explain sequential asylum-immigration from 
these countries to Sweden. To realize a migration system, two or more countries have to 
be linked. If this is the case, migration is believed to arise from these links. Examples of 
such links are colonialism, political influence, trade, investment or cultural ties. In this 
context Mezey et al. (2003) stress that an “indirect connection” (Mezey et al., 2003:30) 
exist between Sweden and Iran and Sweden and former Yugoslavia. In short, they view 
Swedish arms transfers to the two countries in question as a macro linkage, while 
informal social networks established by previous Iranian visiting student programs and 
Yugoslavian labor migration to Sweden constitute links on the micro level. During both 
conflicts, the Iran-Iraq conflict and the breakdown of former Yugoslavia, asylum 
applications from Iranians and Yugoslavs filed in Sweden rose dramatically. Their study 
is limited to immigration data from the 80s and early 90s and to export data by the major 
Swedish arms manufacturer in this period.  
  
Migration Theory 
 The field of migration studies presents a few well-known theories and models of 
international migration, though none of them focus on asylum-immigration. For instance, 
the theoretical appraisals of labor migration models from neo-classical economics have 
been put forward both on macro (Ranis and Fei, 1961; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 
1969) and micro-levels (Sjaastad, 1962; Borjas 1990), along with the segmented labor 
market theory by Piore (1979), and the more recent new economics of labor migration 
theory as described by Stark (1991), as well as the theoretical approach of hegemonic 





359). They all share the view of individual economic maximization via labor 
opportunities as a determinant for destination choice, with the exception of Stark (1991), 
who views unemployment insurances as an additional factor that will minimize the risks 
of labor migration. 
 Apart from economics, theoretical elucidations include the international 
immigration policy theory (Meyers, 2000); the world society approach (Hoffmann-
Nowotny, 1989); social capital theory (Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994); world-
systems theory (Wallerstein 1980; Sassen, 1988) 3 ; theory of cumulative causation 
(Massey, 1990); network theory (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, and 
Taylor, 1993); institutional theory (Massey et al., 1993); and finally the migration 
systems theory, which largely builds on the previous four theories, (Kritz, Lim, and 
Zlotnik, 1992; Zolberg and Smith, 1996). From these theories a few possible 
determinants for destination choice of labor migrants can be drawn. These include 
immigration policy (not to be confused with asylum policy) in the host country and 
cultural and linguistic similarities between sending and receiving countries. Other factors 
are historical, linked to colonial and industrial development, which has provided 
economic imbalances between countries that are considered to pull migration to where 
greater economic opportunities exist. Also, ethnic enclaves in destination countries are 
considered to pull based on close relationships and informal networks. Besides from such 
networks, advise for immigrants also come from humanitarian groups aiding in 
obtainment of legal documents and the access of foreign labor markets. In short, most 
                                                
3 For a more comprehensive outline on the similarities between World System Theory and Marxist theories 
as well as its derivative of dependency theory, see Andre Gunder Frank 1966; Cardoso and Faletto 1986; 





theories stress prior links between countries as explanatory factors of why labor migrants 
choose to go where they go. Often, these links relate to trade or external politico-
economic influences exerted by some countries in others.  
 
Quantitative Works on Asylum Destinations 
To my knowledge, the following summary of key findings in seven different 
quantitative studies summarizes all quantitative research on determinants for asylum 
destination choice among Western European countries.  
Böcker, in a small quantitative study, focuses on one time point from a larger 
qualitative study with Havinga (Böcker and Havinga 1998). Though she does not report 
which year she looks at, her study consists of 44 origin countries and 10 destinations in 
Western Europe. She examines the impact of colonial, cultural, and language ties, as well 
as geographical proximity and trade relations on the choice of destination. Only colonial 
and language ties, as well as geographical proximity shows an impact on the choice of 
destination. The first two are positively related while the latter, surprisingly, is negative. 
In the qualitative section Böcker and Havinga (1998) examine patterns of origins and 
destinations for asylum seekers in the EU between 1985-1994. They find that asylum 
seekers from a specific country of origin tend to choose a specific country within the EU. 
This trend is credited to historical links between the sending and receiving country, such 
as colonial or labor migratory connections. When the patterns of origin and destinations 
are compared for separate years, however, it becomes clear that destination targets 
constantly change. Moreover, some cases are also found to speak against the logic of 





the home country of the applicants receive more applications from these countries than 
the actual former mother country. Nevertheless, the authors attribute some of the shifts in 
inflows, from one EU country to another, to changes in policy measures in the more 
popular destinations. Though, in the end they find such restrictions to have very limited 
effects. They also conclude, for the 10-year period in question, that no simple linear 
relationship exists between numbers of applications and the population size of the host 
country or its gross national product (GNP).  
 Vogler and Rotte (2000), building on an earlier study by Rotte, Vogler, and 
Zimmermann (1997), examined asylum inflow from 86 Asian and African countries to 
Germany for the period 1981 to 1995. Two significant relationships were found: 1) with 
stock of foreign nationals, which had a positive association; 2) with trade, which is 
contrary to Böcker (1998), who had a negative relationship. No correlation was found 
with German aid expenditure to the countries of origin of applicants. 
 Holzer and Schneider (2002), examine the determinants of all asylum applications 
filed in Western Europe, EU, and 20 OECD countries between 1980 and 1995. They find 
negative correlations with higher unemployment, inflation rates, and the economic 
growth rate. Clearly, the latter result is both unanticipated and contrary to previous 
findings by Böcker and Havinga (1998). Holzer and Schneider find no association with 
the ideological orientation of governments, extremist right-wing electoral success, or, 
contrary to Vogler and Rotte (2000), with the stock of foreigners in the total population 
of each destination.   
 When examining the total inflow of asylum seekers to Germany and Switzerland 





nationals as well as geographical proximity to exert a positive influence.  While the first 
confirms findings by Vogler and Rotte (2000), contrary to Holzer and Schnider (2000), 
the second is opposed to Böcker (1998) who found a negative relationship. 
 Thielemann (2003) analyze 20 OECD countries between 1985 and 1999 and finds 
two negative relationships with inflow: 1) the total number of registered unemployed 
people; 2) deterrent policy measures (based on a constructed index). The first is in line 
with previous findings by Holzer and Schneider (2002). Thieleman explains the 
correlation by an awareness of economic opportunity and the second by transfers in 
knowledge of denied entries, via informal asylum networks, to new applicants. Contrary 
to Holzer and Schneider (2002), however, a strong positive association is shown with 
historical factors, measured by the share of foreign inhabitants from the top five origins 
of asylum seekers. This is explained by a general importance of ethnic bonds and that 
information about the target country reaches asylum seekers via ethnic networks. 
Actually, this is also somewhat implied by Böcker (1998) and Böcker and Havinga 
(1998), where historical factors such as colonial and language ties were pointed out to 
have an impact on destination choice.  Another significant and positive relationship by 
Thielemann is host country aid expenditure in third world countries, relative to the gross 
national product, suggesting that reputational factors, of how generous a country is, are 
important. Unlike Holzer and Schneider (2002) but like Böcker and Havinga (1998), 
Thielemann finds no association with the economic growth rate. Contrary to Böcker 
(1998) and Holzer, Schneider, and Casey (2002), he finds no correlation with 
geographical distance.  





Holzer and Schneider (2002), and Thieleman (2003), when he explores determinants for 
inflow to Western European countries between 1982 and 1999. Surprisingly, and contrary 
to previous findings, by Holzer and Schneider (2002) and Thieleman (2003), he finds no 
association with the unemployment rate. The same is true for levels of social and welfare 
expenditures. Nevertheless, unlike Böcker and Havinga (1998) and Thielemann (2003), 
but exactly like Holzer and Schneider (2002), he finds a negative association with the 
economic growth rate. Moreover, contrary to Holzer and Schneider (2002) he finds a 
negative relationship with extremist right-wing electoral success and a weak, albeit 
positive, association with left-wing dominated governments, suggesting that the 
ideological orientations of governments do matter. Moreover, like Thielemann (2003), 
but contrary to Holzer and Schneider (2002), there is a strong and positive correlation 
expressed by the presence of existing refugee communities, which he suggests is due to 
ethnic bonds that continue to pull over time. Similarly he also finds positive associations 
with colonial links, common language with the host country, and geographical proximity. 
While the first two confirms prior findings by Böcker (1998), Böcker and Havinga 
(1998), and Thielemann (2003), the latter is contrary to Böcker (1998) and Thielemann 
(2003) but confirms Holzer, Schneider, and Casey (2002). Neumayer also notes that the 
Schengen Convention countries managed to lower their inflow during the same period.  
 In 2005 Neumayer improves on his 2004 study of Western Europe from 1982 to 
1999 and builds on findings by Vogler and Rotte (2000) and Holzer, Schneider, and 
Casey (2002).  Among the important determinants for inflow is geographical proximity. 
Also, lagged sum of asylum seekers is significant, which he explains by asylum networks 





from asylum receiving countries to the countries of origins of applicants, religious 
similarity, or colonial links. In addition, neither aid nor trade is significant, as these 
factors probably are “too casual to have a significant impact upon asylum migration” (p. 
405). In conclusion, the significance of asylum stock confirms Neumayer (2004) and 
Thielemann (2003) but remains contrary to Holzer and Schneider (2002). For 
geographical distance, he confirms his own findings from 2004, as well as Holzer, 
Schneider, and Casey (2002) but remain contrary to previous findings by Böcker (1998) 
and Thielemann (2003).  The significance of asylum seekers and ethnic bonds also 
confirms his 2004 findings as well as Thielemann (2003) but remains contrary to Holzer 
and Schneider (2002). That colonial links are insignificant, however, is contrary to his 
2004 findings and thus also to Böcker (1998), Böcker and Havinga (1998), and 
Thielemann (2003). The insignificance of aid expenditure is contrary to Thielemann 
(2003) and the insignificance of trade confirms Böcker (1998) but is contrary to findings 
by Vogler and Rotte (2000).  
 
Assessment of Previous Findings  
 When reviewing previous works I recognize two areas to explore. The first 
concerns the hypothetical relationship between arms export and asylum inflow and the 
second an under theorized framework for asylum-immigration. From research on arms 
export there is a general pattern between Swedish arms export and asylum inflow. The 
first thing to do is to see if there is a more specific pattern and to see if it holds more 
generally. If it does, then, it is likely to be spurious. The reason for this is the absence of a 





countries would go directly to the source of arms export. In my view, such an obscure 
connection does not make sense since out-flow can go anywhere. It seems that a 
connection cannot be explained unless other factors are taken into account, as in the case 
by Mezey et al. (2003) where they refer to previous establishment of social networks. 
Therefore, if a correlation is found it ought to depend upon other factors than arms 
export. In short, from a theoretical point of view I argue that causes of outgoing 
migration should be separated from determinants of asylum-immigration. To illustrate 
this point I use an example from the asylum-immigration discourse presented by 
Amnesty International that builds upon the assumption of an indirect connection between 
these two variables. Contemplate the following statement by Amnesty International in the 
context of EU: 
 
In stark contrast with the enormous obstacles that refugees have to overcome to 
find refuge and protection in the EU, is the ease with which arms continue to find 
their way from Europe to fuel violent conflict… Deficiences [sic] in EU policies on 
third countries, such as inadequate controls of small arms exports from and through 
EU member states to third countries, may contribute to the conditions which force 




 In this case EU is seen as an aggregated actor whose export may have an indirect 
impact on asylum-immigration going to EU. Like in previous examples, however, there is 
no explanation as to why a possible contribution to out-flow migration would generate 
inflow back to the source of arms. Moreover, one can think of an example that provides 
an opposite logic to any assumed indirect connection between these variables. A case in 
point is China. Judging from arms transfer data ranging from 2000 to 2007, China 
qualifies as the fifth largest supplier of arms in the world (Grimmett, 2008: 69). However, 





cases (UNHCR, 2005: 290). Following this logic, the reasons for the large asylum-
immigration to Western Europe ought to depend on other factors.  
 Furthermore, the importance of a causal mechanism to explain correlations in all 
sociological research is well documented and commonly established practice. It is one 
thing to note trends between two variables, but it is another to explain how they connect. 
And if one cannot think of a reasonable explanation as to why the one variable would 
explain the other, then the correlation is likely to be spurious. Hedström and Swedberg 
(1996) provide a good example of the importance to explain macro level connections by 
means of individuals in their macro-micro-macro approach. In following their model, 
first, on the macro-level there has to be an observed correlation between A and B and, 
second, this correlation has to connect to a micro level explanation. To note a correlation 
between arms export from A to B and sequential asylum-inflow from B to A cannot infer 
to micro from macro. It is therefore merely a macro level phenomenon lacking a micro 
level explanation as to why asylum-immigration arises to the same destination as the 
source of arms. In fact, once an individual has become an asylum seeker the destinations 
to choose from are many and could therefore possibly lead to C, D, E, F and so on. For 
that reason, to thoroughly examine the relationship between these variables I will proceed 
to test the hypothesis provided by Amnesty International on the aggregated level of the 
EU. To do so, I test arms-export data from 17 Western European countries, covering 26 
years (1981 to 2007), against data on asylum-inflow to these same countries. In addition, 
I also perform disaggregated country level tests for direct correlations. 
 The second thing to do is to develop a specific framework for asylum-immigration 





migration theory, tends to treat asylum seekers as labor migrants, which, because of their 
rather different life situations, is problematic. Because of this tendency, however, most 
theoretical propositions have already been examined in the existing body of quantitative 
studies. Though, the findings are often uncertain given the frequency of contradictory 
results. Moreover, for two of the studies generalizations are difficult. For example, 
Vogler and Rotte (2000), focuses exclusively on Germany, while Holzer, Schneider, and 
Casey, (2002) look at Germany and Switzerland. With respect to the remaining works, 
the periods under scrutiny extends to 17 years at most. In view of this, I will add to 
existing literature by examining what factors, as different from those presupposed by 
labor migration theory, explains destination variances in asylum-inflow. I look at 17 
Western European countries over 26 years and outline three factors that I argue will hold 
to explanation the variance in destinations. Next, I formalize these factors as variables for 
the statistical analysis. In doing so, I diverge from migration theory while drawing on 
previous quantitative works. This is how my study makes a contribution.  
 
What Determines Inflow and Why? 
Once an asylum seeker has left the home country and intends to seek asylum 
somewhere in Europe there are 17 possible countries to choose from. Considering the 
high levels of insecurity that asylum seekers are exposed to in their countries of origin, 
while exiting their home country, as well as in their journeys to Europe, what ought to be 
important for determining their choice of destination are aspects that indicate the opposite 
of these experiences.  Of theoretical relevance therefore are levels of security, hospitality, 





generosity of the welfare state, absence of far right politics, and accommodation for 
religious diversity are conditions that can be assumed to have a real sway in the cost 
benefit analysis of destination choices made on the individual level of each applicant 
respectively.  
In contrast to a how wealthy a country is, which spread can be uneven over a 
population, a very generous welfare state decreases inequalities among the population 
through redistributive policies. It generates greater equality of opportunity to education 
and healthcare with documented outcomes in higher levels of literacy and life expectancy 
(Sen, 1996). While varying in their cover of traditional social risks such as 
unemployment, illness, disability and old age, today the European welfare states are 
primarily concerned with streamlining policy and responses to new challenges. Of 
particular importance are social justice and inclusion, full employment for both women 
and men, support for single parenthood, and the upholding of an active and 
knowledgeable population in an era of demographic changes faced by a large and aging 
population (Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck & Myles, 2002). With respect to 
asylum-inflow, the generosity of the welfare state is likely to matter because of all these 
reasons, primarily because together they signify security. Accordingly, if a welfare state 
is very generous, its possibility of being selected in the trade off between potential 
destinations can also be assumed to be larger as its attraction value ought to increase. 
The absence of far right politics in a potential host country can be implicitly 
understood to influence the choice of destinations among asylum seekers because far 
right party-platforms have tendencies to violence, neo-fascism, and anti-immigration. 





support for halting further immigration and ending all programs in favor of 
multiculturalism (Eatwell, 2000:407). The more prevalent such ideological sentiments 
are, the greater the projected message of an insecure environment for asylum-seekers. 
Also, hostile attitudes go along with indirect effects on asylum policy, as higher 
concentrations of right wing populism in potential host countries are indicative of 
restrictive asylum-policies (Hatton, 2005:112-113). As a result, such countries are likely 
to appear less attractive among applicants as it implies that the chances of having their 
application rejected increases, while if successful, their chance of accessing general 
welfare decreases.  
Religious diversity can be assumed to matter for two reasons. First, on a more 
general level, it gives an image of how pluralistic a society is. Varying degrees of state 
support for religious diversity also indicates actual possibilities to practice ones culture. 
Likewise, pluralistic countries imply a greater openness towards asylum-seekers 
compared to less pluralistic ones and indicates an acceptance of foreigners. Second, and 
more importantly, I argue that higher levels of religious diversity are indicative of pre-
established networks that pull inflow. In order for welfare, far right, or religious diversity 
to enter a cost benefit analysis at all, the information about their relevance has to reach 
the asylum seeker. In explaining the second aspect of why religious diversity matters, 
therefore, I will partly build on network theory proposed by Granovetter (1973).  
It must to be noted that my approach differs from network theory presented within 
previous literature on migration theory for three reasons: (1) previous theory focuses on 
close social connections presented by family and friendship ties in migration for job 





previous theory also hold ethnic ties as unique network characteristics in the 
establishments of ethnic entrepreneurial enclaves among immigrant groups  (Valdez, 
2002:1-2); and (3) previous theories stresses a connection between immigrants and non-
migrants for employment at the destination; (Massey et al., 1993). By contrast, my 
approach differs in all three aspects.  
First, I argue that close connections in relationships are not crucial for asylum 
migration, as I hold the opposite to be true, for reasons that I will elaborate on below. 
Second, I argue that is not important what ethnic groups inhabit a country in order to 
decide for a destination since asylum seekers can be assumed to not primarily be on the 
move because they intend to rejoin with a specific community or advance their job-
opportunities within ethnic entrepreneurial enclaves. Their situation differs in this respect 
from other migrants, as they are assumed to flee persecution. As such, close ties used to 
advance job opportunities are not a crucial determinant for destination. In particular since 
the most important thing for an asylum seeker ought to be to reach a safe and secure 
environment that denotes the opposite of what has been experienced in the home country. 
Prospects pertaining to job advancement are therefore irrelevant in this context. In this 
respect, some of the previous literature also stresses the importance of language for 
destination choice of asylum seekers. This goes hand in hand with the argument for job 
enhancement where colonial ties and language similarities are seen as crucial 
determinants for labor migration. While linguistic similarities between the country of 
origin and country destination may be important for job advancement, this argument can 
hardly be relevant for an asylum seeker since their situation is quite different from labor 





migration theory to the context of asylum-immigration. Moreover, keeping in mind the 
variance in targeted destinations, regardless of destination, if one intends to settle in a 
foreign country, language training is unavoidable in the long-term perspective. Language, 
therefore, like access to work, should not matter for inflow. Third, knowing that refugee 
communities tend to be segregated from communities by nationals and rarely integrate to 
the job market efficiently, the aspect of migration theory which stresses a connection 
between immigrants and non-migrants for employment at the destination is not likely to 
be applicable in the context of asylum-immigration. Instead, by following Granovetter 
(1973), I will argue that efficient intra-group networking within alienated refugee 
communities occurs for other purposes than job search. And, that how efficiently 
information is diffused through these networks depends on the degree of religious 
diversity within each community. This last point also ties in to my argument about how 
close connections in relationships are not crucial. I begin to address the first and the 
second point will follow.  
Now, it is commonly known that information concerning possible destinations 
reaches asylum seekers via informal networks. Essential information is received from 
acquaintances, family or friends, or friends of friends and family, as well as agents or 
traffickers that assist in travel arrangements. Agents, in turn, are connected with local 
refugee communities in Europe and are able to stay up-dated on crucial information 
regarding policy changes and the like (Robinson and Segrott, 2002:1-4). In this respect, I 
view the refugee community of a destination country as a distinct group that forms part of 
aggregated networks of “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973) that link people across national 





Firstly, it rests on a foundation of similar life experiences, which stands in contrast to that 
of the rest of the population.  And secondly, while having a geographically clustered and 
gathering character within the community it has a segregated nature separating it from the 
rest of the population (Kelly, 2003). The boundaries between communities are therefore 
defined. Moreover, in terms of religious diversity, it is fair to assume the refugee 
community to be heavily pluralistic as its members come from a plethora of different 
backgrounds. Accordingly, what connects this group of individuals is not their religious 
similarity but the “weak ties” constituted by the commonalities of their many life 
experiences. Additionally, the religious demography of Western Europe has with respect 
to past 500 years, or so, been rather homogenous, signified by Christianity as the main 
religion. Population wise, it is therefore reasonable to assume that religious diversity is 
indicative of a recent demographic change, such as that of emerging refugee 
communities. In this respect, linguistic and ethnic diversity cannot constitute an 
equivalent measure of diversity since the history of Western Europe is colored with wars 
that have altered national boundaries. Historically, this has allowed for many changes 
whereby differing European ethnicities, also speaking their own mother tongue, have 
been incorporated into new territories. Likewise, continuous intra-European migration 
also blurs linguistic and ethnic diversity from being able to differentiate between old and 
recent add-ons of diversity, such as that provided by the refugee community.    
Granovetter (1973) is important in this respect specifically because he defines 
“the strength of weak ties” strictly in terms of how fast information can diffuse through 
weak interpersonal ties and regards them “as indispensable to individual’s opportunities 





refugees in European society is, on the one hand, essential in diffusing intra-group 
information across national borders. On the other hand, the internal aspect of religious 
diversity of the refugee community is vital in the establishment of numerous weak ties 
between smaller groupings of intra-groups.  
To illustrate the importance of weak ties Granovetter uses a case study of job 
search. If you are looking for a job it is far more beneficial to contact acquaintances 
(weaker ties) rather than a close friend (strong tie), as a friend is unlikely to provide you 
with information that you do not have. As such, a strong tie between individuals, if it is 
their only tie, is far less valuable when it comes to the diffusion of information compared 
to those who have several weaker ties. As a result, if individuals all have strong ties and 
are all friends then there is a lack of new information reaching the group. Conversely, a 
weak tie can form a bridge between groups, realized by the mobility of an individual 
from one group to another via a new job obtained in the new group (1973:1372-1373).  
In applying this theory to the asylum seeking community, the strength of how fast 
information transcends through the network of acquaintances, friends, family, friends of 
friends and family, and agents can be regarded in relation to how religiously 
fractionalized that community is. Instead of networking through casual linkages when 
looking for a job, as in the example provided by Granovetter, refugees can be assumed to 
network within its community in search for information that is essential for their 
purposes. The mobility of an asylum seeker from its origin to a destination, can therefore 
be assumed to often constitute a bridge between smaller groups of the refugee 
community, which if maintained properly will aid in the diffusion of information through 





In following Granovetter (1973), therefore, I argue that while the segregation of 
refugee communities in European countries may give an appearance of alienation, the 
degree of religious diversity within each community is rather indicative of a greater 
likelihood for “weaker ties”, such as acquaintances, to appear specifically between 
smaller intra-groups. Accordingly, the greater the religious diversity within each 
community, the more likely it is for crucial information to diffuse efficiently across 
national borders. Consequently, while it intuitively is tempting to think that religious 
similarity between applicant and destination would be of importance for determining 
larger inflow, the opposite is true. Indeed, this is in line with previous findings by 
Neumayer (2005:405), who also confirms findings by Böcker (1998), showing religious 
similarity between origin and destinations in the EU to be insignificant determinants for 
destination choices among asylum applicants.  
When added to the cost benefit analysis of destination choices made on the 
individual level of each applicant respectively, religious diversity can thus be assumed to 
contribute to a more cognizant decision for two reasons. Firstly, a country with high 
diversity has a stronger pulling force because of its ability to efficiently diffuse crucial 
information via informal channels. Also, such countries possess a greater knowledge-
stock of asylum application procedures, general information concerning educational 
prospects, as well as information pertaining to access to health care and the like. 
Secondly, on a more general level, diversity is indicative of tolerance and pluralism, and 
this too is likely to transmit through the same channels of many “weak ties”.  
Accordingly, while individual preferences concerning welfare and absence of far 





also linked to the proposed diffusion mechanism captured by religious diversity. The 
more religiously diverse a country is, therefore, the greater the stock of essential 
information as well as its ability of being efficiently diffused. A religiously diverse 
country is therefore a country which asylum seekers can be assumed to have greater 
knowledge about in comparison to countries that are less diverse. Nevertheless, on the 
whole, while religious diversity seems to have a key function for inflow, both welfare 
generosity and absence of far right ought to matter. Their relevance, however, can 




















Case Analysis: Some Examples From the UK, Sweden, and the EU 
In considering the potential significance of a generous welfare state, it is 
interesting to note that previous research accord this aspect to play a rather influential 
part in the choice of destination among asylum seekers. For instance, Robinson and 
Segrott (2002) found that potential access to state funded education had a strong 
influence on the choice of destination among asylum seekers in the UK. In their survey, 
the general perceptions of European welfare levels and economic opportunity were found 
to be more or less the same among all applicants. The understood access to education, 
considered as part of the generosity of the UK’s welfare state, however, was a stronger 
determinant in deciding for possible destinations than the perceived opportunity to obtain 
work (Robinson and Segrott, 2002:3-4). In fact, “most respondents thought that they 
would be able to undertake educational courses when they arrived in the UK and that this 
would significantly alter their options for the future” (Robinson and Segrott, 2002:3).  
Similarly, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2004:17-18) explains the 
phenomenon of single asylum seeking children that arrive in Sweden by its well 
established and largely generous levels of welfare. In many cases the actual reason for the 
asylum claim are to access education or universal healthcare. Frequently, claims of 
asylum put forward by single children have been found to be fraudulent. Instead, poor 
economic conditions in the country of origin, or lack of possibilities to treat a medical 
condition of the child, may be real reasons underlying the claim. Often, these children 
have been found to send parts of their Swedish social security income as remittances to 
relatives in the home country. And, occasionally, single refugee children have also 





future point in time, claiming family ties with the child (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
2004:17-18). Nevertheless, while these examples are specific to refugee children, there is 
good reason to believe that the reputation of Sweden as a generous welfare state holds the 
same attraction value for most asylum seekers. 
Moreover, previous research that examines effects of far right sentiments on 
inflow also indicates that hostile sentiments towards immigrants deter inflow and impacts 
on asylum policy. In particular, policy changes are designed to account for the assumed 
attraction values of generous welfare provisions in host countries. For example, Bloch 
(2000) points out that to “deter those who might come to Britain on account of the 
perceptions of generous welfare provisions … most recent reforms [have aimed to] … 
curtail welfare” (Bloch, 2000:32). And more importantly, that the introduction of such 
policy measures effectively has eroded access to welfare provisions by asylum seekers, 
“creating greater inequalities between asylum seekers and others” (Bloch, 2000:33). Also 
Burnett and Peel (2001) emphasizes this point when they write that the UK “policy of 
fining airlines and transport companies found to be carrying people without the correct 
documents means that it is becoming increasingly difficult for refugees to travel and 
forces them to depend on human traffickers” (2001:486). Clearly, in the shaping of recent 
policy trends, UK authorities are implementing a more restrictive policy aimed to reduce 
the attraction value of welfare in the hope of achieving less asylum-inflow.  Accordingly, 
the UK exemplifies the previously mentioned theoretical relationship between hostile 
sentiments towards refugees and inflow as well as that of the generosity of the welfare 





Furthermore, the same policy trends as in the UK can be seen on a general scale 
across the EU where some studies indicates actual effects on inflow of such 
measurements.  According to this research the level of antagonism in a potential host 
country do seem to indirectly impact on inflow of asylum seekers. Indeed, Hatton 
(2005:112-113) among others, argue that it is commonly acknowledged that intolerant 
public opinion towards refugees has caused European policy makers to restrain policies. 
Consequently, Hatton finds that stricter guidelines have contributed to a reduction in “the 
number of applicants, particularly among those with weaker claims” (2005:113). Also 
Böcker and Havinga (1998) found similar results, where stringent policy measures in the 
European Union “seem[ed] to indicate that policy measures may have marked effects [on 
number of incoming applicants]” (1998:263). In addition, Thielemann (2003:27-29) and 
Neumayer (2004:176) support that firmer asylum policies have deterred total number of 
applicants in the EU. One example of sterner policy that seem to have been particularly 
effective is “enforced physical reallocation of asylum seekers” (Neumayer, 2004:176), 
now implemented by some of the most popular destination countries, like Germany.  
On the individual level of each asylum seeker, research by Neumayer (2005:392) 
accounts for the trade-off between potential access to welfare benefits and hostile 
attitudes towards immigrants in deciding for a particular destination within the EU. He 
argues that images of “generous welfare provisions” in the destination country on the one 
hand increase the benefits for asylum seekers. While, on the other hand, “deterring 
measures such as restriction on welfare benefits and working rights, the risk of ones 





opportunities and the threat of forced removal all raise the cost of migration” (Neumayer, 
2005:392).  
As asylum policy within the EU is becoming more streamlined and stringent, 
asylum seekers are increasingly forced to rely on informal networks. Many often end up 
traveling without proper documents, such as visas now commonly required to prevent 
further inflow (Burnett & Peel, 2001:486). Consequently, asylum seekers are becoming 
increasingly dependent on informal channels in their journeys and application processes 
for asylum. Crucial information of changes in asylum policy, increased rejection rates, or 
an increased likelihood of being accepted because of specific circumstances, are therefore 
very likely to cause adaptations in their strategies and perhaps even alter their choice of 
destination. Efficient dissemination of information can thus be assumed to be more 
crucial in determining levels of asylum-inflow. In this respect, Thielemann (2003:29) 
argues convincingly that information about cases of denied entries in the EU “do reach 
asylum seekers either directly or indirectly through their agents or traffickers … and that 
the likelihood of asylum seekers … to remain in the host country should they wish to do 
so, … is of … utmost importance [in their choice of destination]” (2003:29). This is also 
in line with findings in a survey conducted by Robinson and Segrott in the UK (2002:1-
4), which found that while most asylum seekers are unable to stay updated with changes 
in policy, general information about denied entries do transcend through many of the 
informal networks that asylum seekers rely on. In particular, agents and traffickers are 
more likely to be well versed on policy changes in terms of rejection rates and the like 







Because this is a quantitative study, the previous case analyses are limited in 
scope since they are rather case specific than generally applicable. They do, however, 
serve to illustrate how certain factors play out on the individual level of an asylum 
applicant in the context of asylum-immigration to specific destinations. Having said that, 
the strength of my explanatory model, presented on the following pages, is its general 
applicability. Therefore, by testing variables on a general scale, on the aggregate, across 
17 Western European countries over a period of 26 years, and finding them to hold, or 
not to hold, may very well allow for some cases where the opposite is true, or where my 
findings are not applicable. This is because the model indicates the pooled average size of 
effect of each variable on inflow, drawn from 17 countries, across time, for each country 
respectively. Accordingly, to assume the aggregate average effect of each variable to be 
the same for each country would be an ecological fallacy since the spread may very well 
be uneven between countries. The aggregate coefficient may therefore conceal a 
variance, visible only when disaggregating the data (Lieberson, 1985:107). As such, on 
the aggregate, the average trend for each factor, such as the relevance of how generous a 
welfare state is, the level of right-wing extremist politics in a country, or the degree of 
religious fractionalization, is drawn from the regression coefficient in the model. The 
limitation of the model, therefore, is that the results may only be robust on a general 
scale.  
The statistical modeling technique employed is pooled time series analysis. Two 
effects are controlled for: (1) Unit effects (a problem that occurs when number of 





groups) are controlled for by the estimation technique of Random-effects GLS 
regression; (2) Serial correlation effects (occurs when the number of years > number of 
countries so that there are more average observations per groups than units) are 
controlled for by the Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels-corrected-standard-
errors (PCSEs) estimation technique. In the case of this study, however, it matters little 
which effect is controlled for since the number of units is almost equal to that of the 
number of groups, the number of units are 15 (t-2; 17-2)4. I loose two units because I 
examine across time and the time series analysis approached employed mathematically 




To measure the dependent variable of asylum-inflow to Western European 
countries, I use time series data of submitted asylum applications from the United 
Nations High Commissioner of Refugees’ (UNHCR) Statistical Database. 5  Only 
applications where the origins of the asylum seekers were known are included. The 
number of years for which data is available differs depending on which country is 
examined and ranges from 1964 to 2008. There are certain limitations with this data. As 
it is often held that economic migrants claim asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
some of the claims may be incorrectly accounted for.  However, since it is impossible to 
                                                
4 The 17 countries included in the study are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Malta, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom. 





know exactly how many claims are legitimate, I have been unable to differentiate 
between economic migrants and asylum seekers in the data.  
In order to see if arms export from Western European countries has an impact on 
received inflow of asylum seekers, this independent variable is measured using 
conventional arms export data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database. Time series data is presented as Trend Indicator 
Values (TIVs) listed in US$ million at standard 1990 prices and provide an indication of 
the volume of arms transferred. Data availability differs depending on country and ranges 
from 1950-2008. Trade within Western Europe is excluded from the model.  
As suggested earlier, a correlation between arms export from Western European 
countries and its received asylum-inflow, if found, is likely to be spurious. Instead, I have 
argued that what ought to matter for inflow are (1) generosity of the welfare state, (2) 
levels of far right and (3) religious diversity.  
For the first independent variable (1) I use Source OECD Aggregated Data on 
Social Expenditure, ranging from 1980-2005. The data is in time series measured in % of 
GDP and is obtained from official government statistics. 
Because of problems with reversed causality, independent variable (2) is an 
instrumental variable for which I use World Development Indicators Dataset on 
unemployment as a % of total labor force. Reversed causality appears when the observed 
causation moves in the opposite direction of what is intended. In this case, inflow is 
likely to increase far right politics in a country, since percentage of votes for extremist 
parties are known to increase in reaction to inflow. This creates a problem with respect to 





on inflow. The problem emerge since it is not perfectly clear if what is captured in the 
analysis is the effect of inflow on right wing extremist parties or the effect of right-wing 
sentiments on inflow. More than likely, these variables reinforce each other in a 
synergetic process. To circumvent this dilemma I use a so-called instrumental variable. 
An instrumental variable is a variable that moves in the same direction as the independent 
variable while not being affected by the variable one seeks to explain. However, 
instrumental variables are imperfect substitutes because, with them, we lose the 
opportunity to directly observe the real impact of the variables they are replacing. For this 
reason, they should not be used unless absolutely necessary, which is the case here. For a 
more complete and technical treatment on this issue see Bartles (1991), Angrist, Guido 
and Rubin (1996) and Dunning (2008). Concerning the data, for the instrumental variable 
I use the World Development Indicators Dataset on unemployment as a % of total labor 
force. Unemployment tends to move in the same direction as popularity of far right 
parties (i.e. when unemployment is high the popularity for right wing extremist parties 
increases). This is often seen in the context of political propaganda that scapegoat 
immigrants for taking jobs away from nationals or for parasitizing on the welfare system. 
Availability of time series data on unemployment varies per country from 1980-2008. 
Concerning the suitability of this data, it could be argued that employment opportunities 
might affect migration decisions more generally and as a result there might be a 
measurement error when using this data. In this study, however, I have maid the point of 
not treating asylum seekers as labor migrants as their life situation differs greatly from 
that of labor migrants. Following the line of my previous argumentation, it is therefore 





rate in that country, so this particular variable of unemployment should work as an 
instrumental variable.  
To measure the proposed diffusion mechanism of “weak ties”, independent 
variable (3), I use time invariant data from the Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly and 
Kurlat Dataset on religious fractionalization, measured nationwide. This is because there 
is no time series data available for this variable. Instead, it shows only one observation 
for a particular time point. In this situation, the only thing to do is to treat the 
fractionalization variable as time-invariant. This is acceptable since it is a relatively 
reasonable assumption that fractionalization changes very slowly, if at all. Also, as 
argued previously, religiously, Western Europe has been rather homogenous for the past 
500 years or so, which allows for the assumption of religious diversity as a good measure 
of recent demographical changes in fractionalization, such as that provided by recently 
emerging refugee communities. In this respect, ethnic and linguistic diversity cannot be 
regarded as good of a measure because they display historically inherited variances of 
Western Europe. 
As mentioned previously, in contrast to welfare, the wealth of a country is not 
likely to affect inflow since asylum seekers, theoretically, ought to be mainly interested 
in accessing social security. Welfare, as opposed to wealth, guarantees a more even 
access to health care provisions, education, and social security benefits due to 
redistributive policies. Wealth, therefore, seems to be an unlikely determinant for inflow, 
as it can be concentrated to a small portion of the population. To show this logic I use 
two different independent variables. Independent variable (4) consists of GDP/capita 





Dataset. Availability of GDP data differs among countries going from 1960 to 2008. For 
independent variable (5) I use the Human Development Index Trends provided by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Index data is available from 1975 to 
2008.  
Moreover, I have also argued that ethnic and linguistic diversity, as opposed to 
religious diversity, are theoretically unimportant for inflow and do not constitute good 
measures of diversity within refugee communities. This is because, historically, Western 
Europe been rather religiously homogenous while displaying great variances in 
ethnicities and languages within each country. To illustrate this point, for independent 
variable (6) and (7), I use the Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly and Kurlat Dataset, 
which displays time invariant data on ethnic and linguistic fractionalization respectively, 
measured nationwide. For the same reasons as with religious fractionalization this is 
because there is no time series data available for these variables. In this case too it is a 














Table 2: Measurements of Variables and Data Collection 
Variable Data set Measurement 
Asylum-inflow  




Time series data of total numbers of per person filed asylum applications, 
excluding applicants of unknown origin. Data is obtained by the UNHCR 
from member states official records. 






Time series data is presented as Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) listed in 
US$ million at standard 1990 prices and provide an indication of the 
volume of arms transferred. Trade within Western Europe is excluded from 
the model. Data is originally collected from official government statistics. 
Generosity of 
the welfare state 
Source OECD 
Aggregated Data on 
Social Expenditure 
Time series data of aggregated social expenditure, measured in % of GDP. 
Data is obtained from official government statistics. 
Far right  World Development Indicators Dataset  
Time series data on unemployment as a % of total labor force. Data is 




Easterly and Kurlat 
Dataset on religious 
fractionalization 
Time invariant data on religious fractionalization among population, 
bounded between 0 and 1. Level of aggregation of religion varies across 
countries. Muslim, for example, is sometimes subdivided and other times 
not. Data is originally “from the Encyclopedia Britannica (2001). The 
distinctions in this data are perhaps less controversial and subject to 
arbitrary definitions than the data on linguistic and ethnic fractionalization, 
since the boundaries of religions are more clear and definitions consistent 
across countries” (Alesina et al., 2003). 
Wealth of a 
country  
World Development 
Indicators Dataset Time series data on GDP/capita measured in constant 2000 US$. 
Wealth of a 
country  
Human Development 
Index Trends, UNDP 
Time series data bounded between 0 and 1. It includes three aspects, (1) 
“life expectancy at birth, (2) knowledge and education, as measured by the 
adult literacy rate (with two-thirds weighting) and the combined primary, 
secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio (with one-third weighting), 
(3) standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in PPP terms in 





Easterly and Kurlat 
Dataset on religious 
fractionalization 
Time invariant data bounded between 0 and 1. Some of the ethnicity data 
for European countries “such as Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland 
largely reflects languages (for example, the “ethnicities”… identified in 
Switzerland include: German 65 percent, French 18 percent, Italian 10 
percent, other Swiss 6 percent and Romansch 1 percent. The definition of 
ethnicity combines racial and linguistic characteristics. Data is originally 





Easterly and Kurlat 
Dataset on religious 
fractionalization 
Time invariant data bounded between 0 and 1 “based exclusively on data 
from Encyclopedia Britannica (2001), which reports the shares of 
languages spoken as “mother tongues,” generally based on national census 







Data and Findings 
I begin to examine the argued relationship between arms export and inflow of 
asylum seekers. First, I perform a test of direct correlation between export and inflow on 
country levels. For arms export, I use a lag of 3 years since it is reasonable to assume 
export to have an impact on inflow first after some time. In total, the test covers a period 
of 26 years (1981-2007). The results are presented in Table 3, which shows a notable 
between-country variance. With respect to Sweden, where some have claimed an indirect 
connection, the correlation is weak and shows a value of r = .06 (N=26). Likewise, 
Austria indicates an even weaker correlation of r = .05, while Spain displays no 
correlation at all r = .00 (N=26). In contrast, Portugal displays the strongest direct 
correlation of r = .51, and, similarly, Greece shows a strong correlation of r = .50 (N=26). 
Comparatively, France shows an intermediate value of r = .19, while increasingly 
stronger correlations are displayed by Germany: r = .25, Belgium: r = .26, Denmark: r = 
.27, Switzerland: r = .27, and the Netherlands: r = .32 (N=26). Interestingly, and counter 
intuitively, however, strong negative values are found for Norway: r = -.52, UK: r  = -.32, 
and Finland: r  = -.29, whereas Italy displays a comparatively weaker negative correlation 
of r  =  -.13 (N=26).  For the countries with negative values, this implies that greater arms 










Table 3: Country Level Effects of Arms Export on Inflow 1981-2007 
Country6 Direct Correlation 
Austria .05 






Norway  -.52 
Sweden  .06 
Switzerland  .27 
UK  -.32 
Spain  .00 
Portugal  .51 
Greece  .50 
Germany  .25 
 
Next, I conduct the same test in the aggregate of 17 Western European countries. 
As such, the average trend for arms export on inflow, across time, is drawn from the 
regression coefficient in the model. This indicates the pooled average size of effect of 
export, from each country across time, on its own inflow. Like in the previous case, I use 
a lag of 3 years for arms export (xlag3). The period covered remains 26 years (1981-
2007). The aggregate direct correlation is r = .28 (N=26), clearly strong. As mentioned 
earlier, it would be an ecological fallacy to assume the aggregate coefficient to hold for 
each country alone (Lieberson, 1985:107). This becomes particularly evident by looking 
at the uneven spread between countries in Table 3, which, clearly, is not indicated by the 
                                                





pooled average effect. The aggregate coefficient therefore conceals a variance, visible 
only when disaggregating the data.  
Next, I test the robustness of the aggregated correlation in an extended multiple 
regression model adding the seven independent variables. As seen in Tables 4 and 5, 
when adding the variables the correlation between arms export lagged three years (xlag3) 
and inflow (y) diminishes. Indeed, as argued previously, this indicates a spurious 
relationship between arms export and inflow. Moreover, clearly in line with my 
theoretical presumptions are significant values for levels of welfare (social expenditure), 
far right political parties (unemployment), and religious diversity (religious 
fractionalization). In this respect, in contrast to welfare, the wealth of the country 
(measured by GDP/capita and HDI) is shown to be insignificant for inflow. This is 
because, from the perspective of an asylum seeker, welfare matters since redistributive 
policies guarantees a more even spread of welfare across the population in comparison to 
wealth. Accordingly, the more even the spread the greater the possibility of accessing 
health care provisions, state funded education, and social securities. Wealth, on the other 
hand, is a measure that often conceals an uneven spread. Even if the indicated overall 
wealth is high, in reality it may actually be concentrated to a small portion of the 
population while the rest is rather poor. Nevertheless, regardless of the estimation 
technique used, these findings remain robust, as indicated in both Table 4 and 5. For 
social expenditure and religious fractionalization the coefficients show positive 
relationships with inflow, with religious fractionalization as the strongest determinant. 
Accordingly, while the generosity of the welfare state certainly can be assumed to have 





ties”, constituted by the commonalities of the various life experiences within the refugee 
community, can too be understood to have a real sway in the dissemination of 
information. Also, as expected, unemployment is negatively associated with inflow. The 
greater the level of far right sentiments in a country the lesser the inflow. 
Ethnic and linguistic diversity (ethnic and linguistic fractionalization) shows 
inconclusive results between the models. Because the two different estimations denote 
lack of robustness for these variables their significance can be regarded as relatively 
weak. By contrast, religious diversity remains highly significant for both models. Certain 
similarities exist between religious diversity and ethnic diversity, which in view of the 
findings indicates that these variables may slightly overlap in their measurements. That is 
because ethnic diversity often coincides with religious diversity, also shown by the 
positive sign of their respective coefficients (Table 4 and 5). Still, implicitly, religion 
ought to be more socially cohesive than ethnicity, since it is more common to belong to 
different ethnicities while sharing the same religion than to share ethnicity but not 
religion. This is also exemplified by the inherited ethnic diversity of Europe but rather 
religious homogeneity of the past 500 years or so. Religion thus tends to bridge ethnic 
cleavages. In terms of fractionalization, therefore, religious diversity can be assumed to 
hold a more robust measurement compared to ethnicity and, as such, it is a more 
important determinant of inflow. This, too, is supported by the differences in R2 between 
the models, where ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations exhibit significant values in the 
second model but not in the first. In this regard, the explanatory power of model 1 (Table 
4: R2 = .26) is much stronger than model 2 (Table 5: R2 = .12). For linguistic diversity, 





languages spoken in a country i.e. mother tongues spoken in the household.  It shows that 
more private languages spoken in a country lessens the inflow. However, the values for 
both ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are inconclusive between the models, which is 
in line with reasons discussed previously i.e. that neither linguistic nor ethnic diversity 
ought to matter for inflow of asylum seekers.  
 In sum, contrary to previous studies and discourses put forward by NGOs 
like Amnesty International, I find arms export from Western European countries not to 
impact on their received asylum immigration. Instead, conclusive determinants are social 
expenditure, religious fractionalization and absence of far right politics. In view of social 
expenditure as a significant determinant for asylum inflow one can further hypothesize a 
counter-intuitive relationship between arms export and inflow by drawing on literature 
stressing the “guns for butter trade off” (Russet 1970; Wilensky 1975:74-80; Huber, 
Ragin and Stephens 1993:14, 16, 26-28 among others). These literatures indicate military 
expenditure to be positively linked with the size of the total public sector, but to have a 
negative association to transfer payments and social benefit expenditure. As such, every 
year’s government resources spent on the military are direct diversions from what could 
have been allocated to social expenditure. Social expenditure, therefore, ought to be 
negatively related to arms export. To test this presumption I perform a test in the 
aggregate for direct correlation between these variables, without lag, as the relationship 
should be contemporaneous. The correlation is r  =  -.1486. Consequently, given that 
greater arms export leads to less social expenditure, which in turn reduces inflow, policy 





by NGOs like Amnesty International. Moreover, it also disclaim of any positive 


























Table 4: The Determinants for Refugee Inflow to Western Europe 1981-2007 
Independent Variables Random –effects GLS regression (control for unit effects)7 
Arms export (xlag3) -1.56(4.95)8 
(1): Social expenditure 2,304(1081.92)**9 
(2): Unemployment -3,290(926.19)*** 
(3): Religious fractionalization 12,7164(44470.86)*** 
(4): GDP/capita .24(1.86) 
(5): Human Development Index -23,2264(157254.2) 
(6): Ethnic fractionalization 109,682(78331.36) 





*** p<0.01  ** p<0.05  * p<0.1  
                                                
7 The random-effects (RE) GLS regression is a control for unit effects, which is used to deal with situations 
“where some omitted variables may be constant over time but vary between cases, and others may be fixed 
between cases but vary over time. By using RE both types can be included” (Princeton University, 2007: 
http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/panel.htm#models). When employing RE GLS regression the 
assumption is that the variation across entities is random and uncorrelated with the independent variables. 
RE is thus used if there is reason to believe that differences across entities may have some influence on the 
dependent variable. In this case, geographical differences and differences in population size for the 17 
countries in the study may influence on the dependent variable. I therefore use RE GLS to control for such 
possible effects. One advantage of the RE is that time-invariant data can be included in the model without 
being absorbed by the intercept. Since “RE assumes that the entity’s error terms are uncorrelated with the 
predictors, time-invariant data is allowed to play an explanatory role. RE allows generalizing the inference 
beyond the sample used in the model” (Torres-Reyna, n.d:24-27). Stata’s random-effects estimator is a 
weighted average of fixed and between effects (Princeton University, 2007: 
http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/panel.htm#models). For a general explanation on control for 
unit effects please see the quantitative analysis section.  
8 For all the variables in the Table, the first value shows the coefficient and the second (within parentheses) 
displays the standard error. 





Table 5: The Determinants of Refugee Inflow to Western Europe 1981-2007 
Independent Variables 
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated 
panels-corrected-standard-errors (PCSEs), 
(control for serial correlation effects)10 
Arms export (xlag3) -1.60(5.54)11  
(1): Social expenditure 3045(1111.35)***12 
(2): Unemployment -2,637(895.80)*** 
(3): Religious fractionalization 118,832(40642.76)*** 
(4): GDP/capita -.80(.51) 
(5): Human Development Index -134,077(119625.8) 
(6): Ethnic fractionalization 108,642(40924.03)*** 





*** p<0.01  ** p<0.05  * p<0.1  
                                                
10 Prais-Winsten (PW) is a method employed to deal with (temporal) serial autocorrelation, which occurs 
when there is serial dependence along the time dimension of the data. For the fractionalization data, for 
example, it can be expected that the values of the units from one time period are associated with the values 
from another. To control for such temporal autocorrelation I use the PW technique.  The Panels-corrected-
standard-errors (PCSEs) approach is used to deal with panel heteroskedasticity in panel/time-series-cross-
section (TSCS) analysis by adjusting the standard errors instead of weighting the data. Panel 
heteroskedasticity appear because error variances for a given unit may display time dependence. In TSCS 
data this may affect whole units simultaneously (Worall and Pratt, 2004:37-38). For a more complete 
outline on this approach see Beck and Katz (1995, 1996). In brief, “PCSEs inflate the standard errors in 
light of the panel structure of the data. The PCSE approach leaves the data in their original form and so is 
desirable for those who do not wish to engage in empirical weighting of the data. Some regression routines 
in population statistics packages (e.g., STATA) allow researchers to weight the data by the square root of a 
specified variable as well as opt for the PCSE approach. This means that any heteroskedasticity remaining 
after weighting can be “controlled” for with panel corrected standard errors” (Worall and Pratt, 2004:38). 
For general explanation on control for serial correlations effects please see the quantitative analysis section 
in this thesis. 
11 For all the variables in the Table, the first value shows the coefficient and the second (within 
parentheses) displays the standard error. 





Finally, Table 6 illustrates the cross-time country averages for each variable as 
well as the pooled average.  















export Ethnicity Language Religion Social ex Far right Unempl. GDP/cap HDI 
AUS 12759.47059 35.42857 0.1068 0.1522 0.4146 25.94589 10.87708 3.877692 16842.54 0.8954242 
BEL 10153.36364 33.24138 0.5554 0.5409 0.2127 25.77881 3.718518 8.7512 16193.16 0.9013031 
DEN 5795.724138 65.47369 0.0819 0.1049 0.2333 26.05423 2.30625 6.5408 21824.34 0.904 
FIN 1662.904762 23.82759 0.1315 0.1412 0.2531 25.33646 4.10625 8.380357 16519.13 0.8986667 
FRA 29877.92593 1244.517 0.1032 0.1221 0.4029 26.45219 4.432759 9.661072 16444.97 0.902 
GER 82417.35135 636.8889 0.1682 0.1642 0.6571 24.90142 0 8.622353 18471.66 0.8975 
GRE 4312 9.75 0.1576 0.03 0.153 16.85831 0.1793104 8.58 9013.455 0.8753939 
IRE 3895.875  0.1206 0.0312 0.155 16.50661 0 10.70308 13735.38 0.8770303 
ITA 5039.3125 443.9184 0.1145 0.1147 0.3027 21.61735 1.998276 9.9825 13662.5 0.8890303 
MAT 387.9333333 20 0.0414 0.0907 0.1223  0 6.94 5285.39 0.8186061 
NET 18004.88462 201.2641 0.1054 0.5143 0.7222 23.65154 0.7982758 6.8376 16962.06 0.912697 
NOR 5839.608696 28.03846 0.0586 0.0673 0.2048 22.62375 5.881818 3.756072 24854.8 0.9164848 
POR 408.1111111 52.93333 0.0468 0.0198 0.1438 15.03208 0 6.3175 6991.57 0.8501818 
SPA 5225.961538 87.5814 0.4165 0.4132 0.4514 19.55204 0 16.215 9846.074 0.8935454 
SWE 18534.92593 86.01887 0.06 0.1968 0.2342 30.15373 0.4368421 5.379286 20902.11 0.9108485 
SWZ 11752.40476 87.93478 0.5314 0.5441 0.6083 16.52092 17.025 3.430588 29060.24 0.9151515 
UKM 24781.27586 1384.466 0.1211 0.0532 0.6944 19.34138 0 7.55375 17857.63 0.8940303 
Pooled 






 The findings are limited to its general applicability since the modeling technique 
uses the pooled average effects from each country. As illustrated by the country level 
tests for direct correlations, the large between-country variance was concealed in the test 
performed on the aggregate. Another trade-off between levels of analysis appears with 
respect to the validity of causal inferences, where the benefit of aggregated testing gives 
good external validity as opposed to country level analysis which implies good internal 
validity (Adcok and Collier, 2001:529; Cook and Campbell, 1979:50-59, 70-80). This 
applies to both model 1 (Table 4) and model 2 (Table 5). For these models, however, 
disaggregation implies yet another tradeoff, as some of the key variables will have to be 
dropped because of the nature of the data. The problem appears for the time invariant 
data on ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, as they do not vary within a 
country. To employ time invariant data is perfectly fine when using time-series-cross-
section (TSCS) analysis, as it allows for the inclusion of variables that may be constant 
over time but vary between cases. For country level analysis, however, these variables 
cannot be included. Moreover, availability of time series data on fractionalization is to 
my knowledge limited, which is why I used the time invariant data. To perform 17 
independent country level tests, and drop the fractionalization data, might therefore end 
up miss specifying the model due to omitted variables bias. This would be particularly 
problematic with respect to religious fractionalization, which from a theoretical point of 
view signifies one of the most important variables in the models.  
Nevertheless, while my theoretical proposition of applying Granovetter’s “weak 





asylum-immigration, the operationalization of the concept has limitations of its own. In 
essence, religious fractionalization does not tap Granovetter’s theory to perfection 
because it measures fractionalization on a national scale and not within the asylum 
seeking community solely. And, overall, it constitutes an imperfect substitute for non-
existent data that measures diffusion of information within the asylum seeking 
community. Nevertheless, in absence of such data, I have argued that due to the diverse 
backgrounds of asylum seekers, within each country, religious fractionalization ought to 
be heavily concentrated within the refugee community. In particular as Western Europe 
has been mainly Christian for at least 500 years. Population wise, it is therefore 
reasonable to assume the religious fractionalization, captured in model 1 (Table 4) and 
model 2 (Table 5), to be indicative of a concentrated diversity within the rather recently 
added refugee communities. In this respect, linguistic and ethnic fractionalization cannot 
constitute an equivalent solid measure of fractionalization since the history of Western 
Europe has been colored with wars that have altered national boundaries, allowing for 
new national incorporations of different European ethnicities, also speaking their own 
mother tongue. In addition, continuous intra-European migrations also blur these 
measures from being able to capture recently added fractionalization.    
Another data limitation concerns asylum inflow, where I have been unable to 
account for a plausible portion of economic migrants incorporated into the numbers. It is, 
however, impossible to know exactly how many asylum claims are fraudulent. And, to 
use other options such as the rejection rate as a proxy for telling apart economic migrants 
has at least two apparent problems of its own. Firstly, the availability of such data is very 





Two examples are recent restrictions on visa requirements and policies on “safe third 
country provisions” that allow border guards to deny asylum seekers entry if they do not 
possess of proper documentation, which does not necessarily mean that their intentions 
are fraudulent or that they automatically are economic migrants. On the other side of the 
spectrum, many unofficial immigrants are likely to qualify as asylum seekers, but 
because of the inability to present right documentation they have obtained illegal 
residence. These are also individuals not accounted for in the data on asylum applicants. 
Moreover, since the data only captures documented claims reported by governments, the 
actual numbers of asylum seekers reaching European soil may be significantly higher 
compared to official statistics. This is likely the case for Malta where reported claims are 
very low compared to the numbers of people known to have arrived via water from 
Africa.  
But, perhaps, the greatest limitation of the study is the ability of the model to 
explain only 26% of the variance in destination choice, Model 1 (Table 4), and 12% for 
Model 2 (Table 5). This may be because of omitted variables. There are two additional 
variables that potentially could have been useful determinants, but were omitted due to 
limited availability of data, or because the analysis was performed in the aggregate. 
These are geographical proximity and country policies on asylum immigration. For 
geographical proximity, the origin of applicants has to be accounted for to calculate 
distances between origins and destinations, which implies disaggregation of the data on 
country levels. This becomes problematic since the analysis performed here is in the 
aggregate and total numbers of applications have been used. For policy on asylum 





however, for both these variables to have an effect on inflow. Long distances to 
destinations, like restrictive policies, can both be assumed to decrease inflow. 
 
Case Analysis of Omitted Variables and Model Robustness 
 Because the model is limited in its explanatory power and the findings to a general 
applicability, a plausible large between-country variance can have been concealed in the 
test performed on the aggregate and explanatory power may thus have been depraved due 
to omitted variables. I will therefore perform yet another case analysis of omitted 
variables to examine their role on the country level. The case for analysis will be 
Germany. As was shown by Table 1 in the beginning of the thesis, Germany has 
remained the top 1 destination for asylum inflow. The disproportionate inflow to 
Germany is often attributed to that the German Constitution up until 1993 used a much 
broader definition of asylum in comparison to other European countries.  Conversely, 
Germany’s recognition rate of asylum seekers as refugees is among the lowest in Europe 
(Böcker and Havinga, 1993). Another explanation for Germany’s large inflow might be 
the close geographical proximity to Eastern Europe (Böcker and Havinga, 1993:249-250 
and Hatton, 2005:106). Indeed, as can be seen from Table 1 there is a sharp increase in 
applications in the early 1990s as Germany received 1,374,700 applications following the 
fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, associated with a large inflow of Eastern 
European applicants. In this respect, Austria also experiences a peak in total number of 
applications for the same period, 76,100 applications, which likewise can be attributed to 
its Eastern border (Hatton, 2005:106). However, Table 1 conceals that the majority of 





yielding restrictions to the German Basic Law and the legislation concerning foreigners 
introduced the concept of ‘safe third country provisions’. Consequently, many asylum 
seekers were denied entry at the German border, which possibly could explain the 
following 71% drop in claims between 1992 and 1994 (Thielemann, 2003:8-9). In view 
of the German case, it is fair to believe that both asylum policy and geographical 
proximity are variables that ought to be useful determinants for inflow. As mentioned 
previously, however, due to the aggregation level used in the model and because of 
limited availability of data, I have been unable to include these variables in the model. 
 Another concern raised by the disproportionately large inflow to Germany is the 
bias that this may cause in the modeling process. While, Germany can be considered an 
outlier, its inflow is nevertheless so large in comparison to other countries that a possible 
bias in the model may occur. I therefore perform a robustness test of the Model where 
Germany is excluded, which led to a loss of roughly 20 observations. The output is 
almost identical to when Germany was included, as well as the standard errors associated 














Returning to the significant findings. While the respective coefficients hold 
general properties and differs in applicability on a case-by-case basis when looking at 
relationships across countries, it is interesting to note the differences in a 1% increase per 
variable on inflow between country blocks such as north Europe and continental Europe. 
For example, consider average social expenditure, displayed below in Table 7, because of 
variations in expenditure between northern and continental Europe, this variable ought to 
have a greater impact on Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland) where 
the concentration of generous welfare states is higher. Based on the total inflow of 
7,640,206 asylum seekers to Western Europe between 1981 and 2007, by Table 4, a 1% 
increase in social expenditure generates an additional inflow of 2304 asylum seekers to 
Western European countries. Out of these, 837, 751 alone has gone to Scandinavia, 
where a 1% increase in social expenditure signifies an additional inflow of 600 asylum 
seekers to this block. By Table 5 the same 1% raise constitute an additional Western 
European inflow of 3045 people out of which 793 persons would go towards 
Scandinavia. For the same period, Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece) 
has received a total of 428,888 asylum seekers. For this region, the same 1% boost in 
social expenditure yields 420 more asylum seekers by Table 4 and an increased inflow of 
556 for Table 5. With respect to Table 4, thus, the difference in inflow based on a 1% 
increase in social expenditure between north and south Europe is 180 persons and for 





Table 7: Social Expenditure Averages as a % of GDP ranging from 1980 to 200513 
Scandinavian: Average Continental: Average Sweden: Average Portugal: Average 
26.04 18.26 30.15 15.03 
 
Among the northern and continental blocks the most dramatic difference is 
displayed between Sweden (with the highest average social expenditure) and Portugal 
(with the lowest average social expenditure). For Sweden, which received a total of 
500,443 asylum seekers between 1981 and 2007, a 1% increase in social expenditure 
yield an additional inflow of 695 people by Table 4 and by Table 5 the same increase 
generates 918 more applicants. On the others side of the spectrum, Portugal received a 
total of 11,019 asylum applications during the same period and for a 1% increase in 
Portuguese social expenditure, inflow boosts with 346 asylum seekers by Table 4 and for 
Table 5 the same 1% raise produce an additional 458 applicants. The pair wise difference 
for Table 4 thus constitutes 349 applicants and for Table 5 the same variance is 460.  
In the same way, for religious fractionalization, see Table 8 below, the 
discrepancy between the five most religiously diverse countries (the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, and Spain), which has received a total of 4,865,702 
asylum applications for the period in question, and the five least religiously diverse 
countries (Malta, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Norway), which has received a total of 
334,219 applications for the same period, is 599 for Table 4 and 560 for Table 5. That is, 
while there is a total increase in inflow with 127,163 asylum seekers based on a 1% 
overall increase in religious fractionalization in Western European countries, for a 1% 
                                                





increase in religious fractionalization among the five most religiously diverse countries, 
this block would receive an additional 797 applicants according to Table 4. For Table 5, 
where an overall 1 % increase would generate an additional inflow of 118,832 people to 
Western European countries, the same 1% increase for the most diverse block denotes an 
additional inflow of 745 asylum seekers. By contrast, for the least religiously diverse 
countries the same calculation yields a modest increase of 198 asylum seekers for Table 4 
and for Table 5 an even lower effect of an additional 185 applicants.  
Table 8: Religious Fractionalization Average Calculated by Time Invariant Data14 
Top 5: Average Bottom 5: Average Netherlands: Average Malta: Average 
0.627 0.156 0.72 0.12 
 
When comparing the most religiously diverse country (the Netherlands), which 
has received a total of 468,127 applications for the period in question, with the least 
diverse (Malta), which has received a total of 5,819 asylum seekers, the discrepancy is 
762 for Table 4 and 713 for Table 5. For the Netherlands a 1% increase in religious 
fractionalization, generated by Table 4, produces an additional inflow of 918 asylum 
seekers and by Table 5 the same raise gives an extra 858 submissions. In contrast, by 
Table 4 Malta would receive an extra 156 asylum seekers and by Table 5 the increase 
would constitute a further inflow of 145 applicants.   
Moving to unemployment. When looking at the five countries with the overall 
highest average unemployment (Spain, Ireland, Italy, France, and Belgium), presented in 
                                                






Table 9, which as a block has received a total of 1,501,232 applications, a 1% increase in 
unemployment generates a decrease in inflow of 364 people by Table 4. For the same 
Table, this can be compared to an overall decrease of 3290 applicants for a 1% increase 
in unemployment in all of Western Europe. For Table 5 the reduction in inflow to the 
same five countries is slightly less as it indicates 292 fewer applications. For all of 
Western Europe, the total reduction for a 1% overall increase in unemployment is 2637 
applications. Consider the opposite, five countries with the overall lowest unemployment 
(Switzerland, Norway, Austria, Sweden, and Portugal), which as a block has received a 
total of 1,573,196 applications, by Table 4 a 1% increase in unemployment yields a 
decrease of 150 asylum seekers and by Table 5 the same increase denotes an impact of 
120 less applicants. The discrepancy between the two blocks is thus 214 for Table 3 and 
172 for Table 5.  
Table 9: Unemployment Average as a % of Total Labor Force from 1980 to 200715 
Top 5: Average Bottom 5: Average Switzerland: Average Spain: Average 
11.062 4.552 3.431 16.215 
 
In comparison with the generosity of the welfare state and religious diversity, 
levels of far right sentiments in a country produce the greatest impact on numbers of 
asylum applicants. This, too, becomes crystallized when comparing the impact of a 1% 
increase in unemployment between two diametrically opposed examples. On the one 
hand, Switzerland, which has the lowest average unemployment and has received a total 
                                                





of 493,601 applications, would by a 1% increase in unemployment in Table 4 receive 113 
less asylum applicants and by Table 5 the impact signifies a drop of 90 submissions. On 
the other hand, Spain, which has the highest average unemployment and has received a 
total of 135,875 applications, would by Table 4 experience a decline of 533 applications 
and, similarly, by Table 5 the inflow would fall with 428 asylum seekers. The difference 
between Switzerland and Spain in terms of cutbacks in asylum inflow is therefore 420 by 





















Illustration of Some Possible Interactions  
Given that social expenditure is shown to be a statistically significant variable for 
inflow of refugees, it is on the one hand interesting to note that although being the second 
largest recipient of asylum applicants16, the UK’s social expenditure falls vaguely under 
the European average. In fact, in terms of social expenditure the UK positions as number 
12 out of 17 and differ with 36% from the leading country of Sweden. As such, the 
country can be regarded to have an intermediate level of social expenditure. On the other 
hand, social expenditure is also shown to be negatively correlated with arms export and 
in this respect it is not surprising to find that the UK is the foremost European exporter 
with an average Trend Indicator Value (TIV) of 1414.5517. Nevertheless, while the UK 
qualifies as the second major recipient of refugees, when comparing the UK to Germany, 
which has the highest number of asylum applicants in Europe, the UK represents a mere 
23.5% of the German total of 3 049 442 submissions. In this respect, the UK’s overall 
inflow of refugees can be regarded as relatively small and coincides more or less with 
what can be expected from its level of social expenditure.  
In accounting for far right, the UK displays a value slightly below the average and 
can therefore be considered to have an intermediate level of right wing populism. In 
                                                
16 In this study, only applicants with a known origin have been taken into account. The numbers may 
therefore differ slightly from data presented elsewhere. 
17 “SIPRI data on arms transfers refer to actual deliveries of major conventional weapons. Data on arms 
transfers are presented in the form of SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs). TIVs are expressed in US$ m. 
at constant (1990) prices. TIVs are an indication of the volume of arms transferred and do not represent the 
financial value of goods. Hence, TIVs can be used to measure trends in international arms transfers, such as 
changes in the total flow of weapons and the geographic pattern of arms exports or imports. The data can 
also be used to measure a particular country's share of the overall import or export market or the rate of 






addition, the UK is ranked as the second most religiously diverse country in Europe. 
From the limited variables discussed here, one can therefore argue that what seems to be 
pulling inflow to the UK is a combination of a intermediate (slightly below average) level 
of social expenditure, with a intermediate (slightly below average) level of far right, and a 
high level of religious fractionalization. Accordingly, in the case of the UK religious 
fractionalization can be assumed to contribute to an overall high attraction value for 
asylum applicants. Moreover, when taking network theory into account, the latter 
variable can also be assumed to explain some of the country’s large inflow because of 
indicated levels of efficiently diffused information. 
By contrast, Sweden’s social expenditure is the highest in Europe and in terms of 
inflow it is slightly above the European average. While the country can be regarded as an 
intermediate recipient of asylum applicants, the difference between the UK and Sweden 
in terms of average number of asylum applicants is a marginal 7.1%. In comparison to 
Germany, Sweden displays a 16.4% of Germany’s total and therefore becomes the 4th 
largest recipient of refugees in Europe. Moreover, the country depicts clear polar 
opposites in terms of social expenditure and arms export. Sweden is well under the 
European average in terms of export and has an average Trend Indicator Value (TIV) of 
100.7418. Clearly, in this case a large level of social expenditure is in line with small 
export and an above average inflow. 
                                                
18 “SIPRI data on arms transfers refer to actual deliveries of major conventional weapons. Data on arms 
transfers are presented in the form of SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs). TIVs are expressed in US$ m. 
at constant (1990) prices. TIVs are an indication of the volume of arms transferred and do not represent the 
financial value of goods. Hence, TIVs can be used to measure trends in international arms transfers, such as 
changes in the total flow of weapons and the geographic pattern of arms exports or imports. The data can 
also be used to measure a particular country's share of the overall import or export market or the rate of 






When looking at other variables such as far right and religious fractionalization, 
both shows values below the averages. With respect to right wing populism, Sweden 
ranks as number 14 out of 17. And in terms of religious fractionalization, it is the seventh 
most religiously homogenous country in Europe. In this case, what seems to be attracting 
inflow is simply a high level of social expenditure combined with a low (below average) 
value of far right. With respect to a low (below average) value of religious 
fractionalization, therefore, it can be argued that despite the highest social expenditure in 
Europe and a very open policy towards asylum applicants, the information about these 
circumstances are not being efficiently diffused. In part, this interaction could possibly 
explain the country’s intermediate level of inflow. Conversely, for the asylum applicants 
that do receive information about Sweden as a potential host country, the country can be 

















I summary, I have by means of arms-export data from 17 Western European 
countries, tested against inflow of asylum seekers to these countries, covering the past 26 
years, disclaimed of that arms-export from these countries contribute to their received 
asylum-inflow. My contribution is therefore both theoretical and empirical. In this 
respect, my main theoretical contribution to existing literature on arms export and 
migration is that I separate causes of outgoing migration from determinants of asylum 
immigration. Empirically, I disprove of claims asserting indirect connections between 
arms export and asylum inflow, which has been put forward both within academic 
literature and by NGOs like Amnesty International. Instead, I find the counter-intuitive. 
Increased arms export leads to less asylum immigration. This is attributed to the so called 
“guns for butter trade off” where social expenditure, one of the found significant 
determinants for asylum-immigration, is negatively associated with arms export but 
positively associated with asylum inflow. Other crucial determinants for inflow are 
absence of far right sentiments and religious diversity. Also, in contrast to previous 
literature on asylum immigration, I build on Granovetter (1973) and propose that 
diffusion of information through asylum networks depend on weak social connections as 
opposed to close relationships like ethnic bonds, family ties, and friendships. In addition, 
I problematize the tendency of existing literature to treat asylum seekers as labor 
migrants and argue for a framework founded on principles which account for the unique 
circumstances and life situations faced by asylum seekers. In doing so, my overall 
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